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HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE ATS AFTER KIOBEL:
PARTIAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY, MISCONCEPTIONS,
AND ELUSIVE AND PROBLEMATIC JUDICIALLY-CREATED
CRITERIA
JORDAN J. PAUST †
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2013, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.1 One of the key issues was whether a judicially-created
general presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes
should limit the reach of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).2 As noted in Part II of this
article, five of the Justices decided that a presumption against extraterritoriality
applies to the ATS and four Justices decided that the presumption should not
apply to the ATS. Related to extraterritoriality, the Court also had to address
“whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action
under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”3 On this issue, Part II
shows that a clear majority of the Justices agreed that a cause of action can arise
under the ATS with respect to violations in foreign territory, either because the
presumption can be overcome in some cases or because it should not apply to the
ATS. However, the Justices have not agreed on what criteria should be used to
limit extraterritorial reach of the ATS and no single set of criteria is favored by a
majority of the Justices.
As explained in Parts III and IV of this article, each Justice has ventured
beyond early, consistent, and informing attention to the reach of the ATS; the
extraterritoriality manifest from the face of the statute in light of the nature of the
law incorporated, its jurisdictional character, and its substantive grasp; and a
clear expression of Congress that should be determinative. Further, as noted in
Part V of the article, the result in Kiobel does not serve human dignity and is
anathema to the human right of all persons to an effective remedy for violations
of customary international law over which there is universal jurisdiction and an
express duty of all parties to the United Nations Charter to take joint and
separate action in order to achieve “universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”4
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1. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) [hereinafter ATS].
3. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
4. See U.N. Charter arts. 55(c), 56.
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II. PARTIAL EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE ATS AND SPLITS AMONG
THE JUSTICES
Regarding extraterritoriality under the ATS, the opinion of the Court,
written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded “that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute
rebuts that presumption.”5 This statement is curious and inapposite because
there was no judicially-created presumption against extraterritoriality in 1789
when the statute was created.6 With respect to application of the presumption in
Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “‘[t]here is no clear indication of
extraterritoriality here,’ . . . and petitioners’ case seeking relief for violations of
the law of nations occurring outside the United States is barred.”7 He added,
“[o]n these facts, all relevant conduct took place outside the United States [a]nd
even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.”8
These statements of Chief Justice Roberts do not unequivocally preclude
every application of the ATS to conduct abroad, however, he would likely apply
the presumption against extraterritoriality. One possibility is that he would
apply the presumption to bar any claim under the ATS where all of the relevant
conduct involving violations of the law of nations takes place abroad. Another
possibility is that he would apply the presumption, but allow ATS claims for
conduct occurring abroad when “the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption.”9 In this
way, the presumption does not obviate all extraterritorial application where all
of the conduct that violates international law occurs abroad, yet the presumption
significantly restricts an extraterritorial reach. I assume that he meant to include
“touch and concern” and “sufficient force” as his preferred but ambiguous
criteria for deciding when the presumption is displaced.
In any event, it is clear that the majority of Justices will not preclude all
extraterritorial application of the ATS. Nonetheless, they have disagreed on
appropriate criteria to be considered with regard to its extraterritorial reach in
particular circumstances and even whether a presumption against
extraterritoriality should apply to ATS litigation. For example, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that “[t]he opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of
significant questions regarding the reach” of the ATS.10 He also noted that there
exist “[m]any serious concerns with respect to human rights abuses committed
abroad,”11 and that
cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law
5.
6.

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 85 n.2 (1998) (claiming that the first use was in 1818).
7. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883
(2010) (deciding on facts that did not involve international law violations or universal jurisdiction)).
8. Id. (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883–88).
9. Id.
10. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. Id.
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principles protecting persons, cases covered neither by [a statute such as the
Torture Victim Protection Act12] . . . nor by the reasoning and holding of today’s
case; and in those disputes the proper implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and
explanation.13

Justice Kennedy assured that the “reach” of the ATS remains “open” and
that there is no automatic denial of an extraterritorial reach of the ATS to conduct
occurring in a foreign state, but that he would apply the presumption against
extraterritoriality in some instances and that there is a need for “further
elaboration and explanation” of what would be a “proper implementation” of
the presumption against extraterritoriality.14
In contrast, while concurring in the judgment, Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, stated that he “would not invoke the
presumption against extraterritoriality” in ATS cases.15
As this article
demonstrates, for several reasons, this approach is the proper interpretation and
implementation of the ATS. First, the presumption against extraterritoriality was
created by the judiciary after the creation of the ATS and was clearly unknown to
Congress in 1789. Second, as Justice Breyer noted, the presumption “does not
work well,” because it “‘rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.’”16 Meanwhile, the ATS
“was enacted with ‘foreign matters’ in mind” and, importantly, the text of the
ATS “refers explicitly to ‘alien[s],’ ‘treat[ies],’ and ‘the law of nations.’”17 Third,
with respect to the more general question raised about whether the ATS can
apply to conduct occurring in a foreign state, Justice Breyer clearly and rightly
recognized that it can and stated that he “would assume that Congress intended
the statute’s jurisdictional reach to match the statute’s underlying substantive
grasp,” which, according to “the statute’s purposes set forth in Sosa,18 includes
compensation for those injured by piracy and its modern day equivalents.”19
However, instead of using a judicially-created presumption against
extraterritoriality and relying on international law as the unmistakable
“substantive grasp,” Justice Breyer preferred to be “guided in part by principles
and practices of foreign relations law” when making a choice whether the ATS
should apply in a particular case.20 He made it clear that he joined “the Court’s
judgment but not its opinion.”21 This choice highlights a lack of consensus with
respect to rationales, doctrines, and criteria for the application of the ATS.
Also concurring, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, would allow
12. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) [hereinafter TVPA].
13. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. See id.
15. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
16. Id. at 1672 (quoting Morrison, 133 S. Ct. at 2877).
17. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
18. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
19. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (italics removed) (citing
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715).
20. Id. at 1671. However, what he referred to is not international or foreign relations “law.” See
infra Part III.H.
21. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678.
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extraterritorial application of the ATS. At the very least, he would allow
extraterritorial application when ATS “‘claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application’”22 and, in his view, such claims “will fall within the
scope of the presumption” and should be barred “unless the domestic conduct is
sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies . . . requirements of
definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”23
Given these opinions, the clear majority of the Court, and perhaps every
Justice, would allow partial extraterritorial application of the ATS. Although for
different reasons, in deciding Kiobel, they did unanimously agree on the ultimate
result where there were foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign
conduct that, from their perspective, did not touch and concern the United States
with sufficient force or involve sufficient U.S. interests. However, they differ on
rationales, doctrines, and criteria that might result in non-extraterritoriality in a
particular case.
III. EVIDENT MISCONCEPTIONS AND UNSEASONABLE MIGRATIONS
A. Missing the Boat With Respect to the Early Cases
While only using two of four early cases that address the ATS, Chief Justice
Roberts stated that “[t]he two cases in which the ATS was invoked shortly after
its passage . . . concerned conduct within the territory of the United States. See
Bolchos [v. Darrel], 3 F. Cas. 810 (wrongful seizure of slaves from a vessel while in
port in the United States); Moxon [v. The Fanny], 17 F. Cas. 942 (wrongful seizure
in United States territorial waters).”24 What Chief Justice Roberts did not seem to
appreciate is the well-recognized fact that a foreign flag vessel is the equivalent
of foreign state territory25 and, therefore, that conduct on board such a vessel
necessarily has an extraterritorial dimension even if the conduct takes place
while the foreign flag vessel is in U.S. waters. Further, as noted in another
writing with respect to Moxon and Bolchos,26 “[i]n Moxon, French persons
engaged in acts that originated from a French vessel and carried onto an English
vessel during its capture in U.S. waters and, as noted, . . . acts on a foreign flag
vessel are acts within foreign state territory.”27 In Bolchos v. Darrel,28 “the original
cause arose at sea” on a Spanish vessel and the ATS allowed the court “to take

22. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting id. (majority opinion)).
23. Id. at 1670. It is not clear what Justice Alito meant by “the domestic conduct,” but I assume
that he meant the domestic conduct within a foreign state that violates international law, especially
because domestic conduct within the United States that is violative of international law must
necessarily touch and concern the territory of the United States.
24. Id. at 1667 (majority opinion).
25. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 196–
97 (4 ed. 2013); Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel, Corporate Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of the ATS, 53 VA.
J. INT’L L. DIG. 18, 28 & nn.46–47 (2012) (citing U.S. and other cases on point) [hereinafter Paust,
Kiobel]; See discussion infra Part III.B.
26. Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 27–28; see also Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 249, 250–51 n.3 (2004) [hereinafter Paust, History of the Act].
27. Moxon v. The Fanny, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
28. Bolchos v. Darrel, 17 F. Cas. 942, 942 (D. Pa. 1793).
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cognizance of the cause” between two aliens, a Spanish claimant and an agent on
behalf of a British national.29
Two other early cases had addressed the ATS in 1794 that were not
mentioned by the Chief Justice. Another case that was prior to the Filartiga line
of cases starting in 1980 that was not mentioned was a district court decision in
1961. In a 1794 case involving the seizure of a Dutch vessel abroad, it was stated
per dictum that “the powers of the district courts are expressed . . . as to civil
causes . . . where an alien sues for a tort only.”30 In another 1794 case, it was
stated per dictum that where a vessel was seized abroad by a foreign vessel “[i]f
an alien sue here for a tort under the law of nations or a treaty . . . the suit will be
sustained.”31 In 1961, another pre-Filartiga ATS case was clearly extraterritorial
and had involved recognized violations of international law within Lebanon and
alien disputants.32 With respect to prior trends in judicial decision, the four
known cases in the 1790s demonstrate that violations of international law
occurring in the equivalent of the territory of a foreign state were clearly
expected to be appropriately within the extraterritorial reach of the ATS whether
or not conduct touched and concerned territory of the United States. There are
no early cases to the contrary and what had been undoubted extraterritoriality
was also evident in the 1961 judicial application of the ATS and would be from
1980 onwards in what became known as the Filartiga line of cases33 that, most
significantly, was later approved by Congress.34
B. Piracy Properly Understood and Its Admitted Reach
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer was correct to emphasize
that piracy does not actually occur on the high seas or “in the water,”35 but that
piracy unavoidably involves the boarding of some other vessel flying the flag of
some state36 and that, therefore, the piratical acts in violation of international law
must necessarily occur in the equivalent of foreign state territory when the

29. Paust, Kiobel, supra note 23, at 27–28 (quoting Bolchos v. Darrel, 17 F. Cas. 942, 942 (D. Pa.
1793); Moxon v. The Fanny, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795)); see also Jordan J. Paust, The History,
Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 249, 250–51 n.3 (2004) [hereinafter
Paust, History of the Act]. There would have been a breach of neutrality under the law of nations
concerning the capture of neutral property, but a treaty changed that result. Moxon, 3 F. Cas. at 810–
11.
30. Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356, 358 (D.S.C. 1794).
31. M’Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D.S.C. 1794).
32. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
33. See note 59 infra. See also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Not surprisingly, both before and after Sosa, courts have consistently rejected the notion that the
ATS is categorically barred from extraterritorial application. See, e.g., [Flomo v. Firestone National
Rubber Co.,] 643 F.3d [1013,] 1025 [7th Cir. 2011)] (‘[N]o court to our knowledge has ever held that it
doesn’t apply extraterritorially’); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (C.A.9 2011) (en banc) (‘We
therefore conclude that the ATS is not limited to conduct occurring within the United States’); Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20 (C.A.D.C. 2011) (‘[W]e hold that there is no extraterritoriality
bar’).”).
34. See infra notes 59, 61.
35. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 635, 642–43 (1818).
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victimized vessel is not a U.S. flag vessel.37 As Justice Breyer stressed, “at least
one of the . . . activities that we found [in Sosa] to fall within the statute’s scope,
namely piracy . . . normally takes place abroad” and “[t]he majority cannot wish
this piracy example away by emphasizing that piracy takes place on the high
seas.”38
Most significantly, piracy implicated universal jurisdiction and,
therefore, “pirates were fair game ‘wherever found’”39—a profoundly important
recognition understood in Sosa40 and affirmed in Filartiga41 and its progeny
where universal jurisdiction pertains, and a recognition that should guide future
decision making concerning the broad extraterritorial reach of the ATS whether
or not violations of international law touch and concern territory of the United
States.
The existence of universal jurisdiction should also constrain
inappropriate use of judicially-created limits.
C. Other Early Violations of International Law and Bradford’s 1795
Opinion
It is most curious that there had been a seeming focus by some Justices on
three violations of international law that happened to be addressed by the British
writer Blackstone, because the Framers and early judiciary clearly had paid
attention to several other serious violations of international law, including
breaches of neutrality addressed by Attorney General Bradford in 1795;42
conduct of poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession; brigandry; slave
trading; war crimes; denials of justice to aliens; and, most importantly, violations
of human rights here and abroad by private and public perpetrators.43 A 1781
37. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672–75 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. Id. at 1672.
39. Id. at 1667. See also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“the jurisdictional principle
that any nation that found a pirate could prosecute him,” “universal jurisdiction exists,” and
“universal tort jurisdiction” is appropriate); Sarei, 671 F.3d at 746 (“the ATS provides a domestic
forum for claims based on conduct that is illegal everywhere” under international law); infra notes
59–60, 101–102; notes 88, 101–102, 129–131 and accompanying text; infra Part VII. Curiously, Justice
Breyer did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that complicitors of international crimes are also
hostis humani generis when they aid or abet crimes under customary international law implicating
universal jurisdiction when he stated that “plaintiffs allege, not that the defendants directly engaged
in acts . . . but that they helped others.” See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1678. Concerning responsibility for
complicitors under international law, see, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 29 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“Congress thus directed that the courts derive the rule of law from the law of nations, and that
law extends responsibility for conduct violating its norms to aiders and abettors”); Cabello v.
Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (11th Cir. 2005); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845–48
(11th Cir. 1996); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp.2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Presbyterian Church
of the Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp.2d 331, 337–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Presbyterian
Church of the Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320–25 (S.D. N.Y. 2003); In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp.2d 7, 52–54 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Estate of Ungar v.
Palestinian Authority, 304 F. Supp.2d 232 (D.R.I. 2004); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp.2d 117,
122 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795) (“and abetted”); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra
note 25, at 69–74; Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 27.
40. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715, 724–25, 732.
41. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoted in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
42. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795).
43. See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 11–12, 193–
202, 208–10 (2 ed. 2003); PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 181–83; Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25,
at 22–23 & nn.19–22; Johan D. van der Vyver, Treatment of International Human Rights Violations in the
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Resolution of the Continental Congress listed some of these and added the broad
category of “infractions of treaties and conventions to which the United States
are a party.”44 Importantly with respect to human rights, Chief Justice Marshall
recognized in 1810 that our federal courts “are established . . . to decide on
human rights.”45 Each of these must have been of concern to Congress.
In any event, and significantly with respect to extraterritoriality, Attorney
General Bradford’s 1795 opinion recognized the undoubted extraterritorial reach
of the ATS when declaring:
there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have injured by
these acts of hostility [engaged in abroad on the west coast of Africa in the
territory of Sierra Leone by private U.S. citizens in violation of the customary law
of nations and treaties] have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United
States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts [by the ATS] in all cases
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the law of nations, or a treaty
of the United States.46

In a strange response to the claim by Petitioners that the language quoted
above reflects the early and consistent understanding that the ATS applies
extraterritorially to violations committed on the territory of a foreign sovereign,
which is undoubtedly true, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the “opinion defies a
definitive reading,” that the U.S. perpetrators had “violated a treaty,” and that
“[t]he opinion hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”47 Yet, as noted, Attorney General
Bradford’s opinion had expressly recognized that “there can be no doubt” that
the foreign victims “have a remedy by civil suit” under the ATS, both customary
and treaty-based international law had been violated and both types of
international law are expressly incorporated by reference in the statute, and there
had been an undoubted reach of the ATS to extraterritorial conduct.48
Clearly, the Bradford opinion and all of the early judicial opinions noted in
Part III A support extraterritoriality in contradistinction to a subsequent

United States, 6 DUKE FORUM FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE at Part C (2014); supra notes 27–31. Concerning
the reach of international law to non-state actors, including companies and corporations, and
recognitions that international law has never been merely state-to-state, see, e.g., Jordan J. Paust,
Nonstate Actor Participation in International Law and the Pretense of Exclusion, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 977 (2011)
[hereinafter Paust, Nonstate Actors]. With respect to “denial of justice,” see Paust, History of the Act,
supra note 26, at 255 & n.13.
44. Resolution of 1781, 21 J. CONT. CONG. 1136–37.
45. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810). Concerning the rich history of use of
human rights precepts by the judiciary, see, e.g., Paust, Nonstate Actors, supra note 43, at 988-89 n.38.
46. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795) (Bradford, Att’y Gen.). In 1907, the
Attorney General affirmed that a private Texas dredging company had acted “in direct violation” of a
treaty and that Mexican nationals injured in Mexico have a right to a remedy and a forum under the
ATS. Mexican Boundary – Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 250, 251–54 (1907).
47. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668. It is unclear what “weighty concerns” he had in mind, but if they
would have anything to do with evident congressional intent the approval of the Filartiga line of cases
by Congress should be determinative as to whether the judicially-created presumption should apply.
By itself, it is a clear indication of preferred extraterritoriality as well as forms of reach. Chief Justice
Roberts did not address the salient fact that there has been congressional approval, nor did he
address the jurisdictional character of the substantive law expressly incorporated in the ATS.
48. See supra note 46; see also supra Part III A-B.
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judicially-created presumption that was unknown to the creators of the ATS in
1789.49 Indeed, when coupled with the extraterritoriality manifest from the face
of the statute in light of the nature of the law that is incorporated and its
jurisdictional attributes, the recognitions in the Bradford opinion and early
judicial opinions should overcome any such presumption.50 Additionally, the
clear expression of Congress addressed in the next section should be
determinative.
D. Extraterritoriality From the Face of the Statute and a Clear Expression of
Congress
On its face, the ATS applies to “any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”51
There are no geographic or substantive limits in the statute other than the need
for a violation of international law to have occurred and it would be
inappropriate for a court to add limits that Congress has never chosen. Further,
as noted above, the facially-evident extraterritorial reach of the ATS was
recognized and undoubted in early cases and opinions of the Attorneys
General.52 Subsequent judicial opinions have also noted that the text of the
statute contains no geographic limitations and that the nature of the substantive
law expressly incorporated and its jurisdictional character necessarily affirm an
extraterritorial reach.53 Additionally,
49. Such a presumption did not exist in 1789. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 745
(9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“There is no indication . . . that a ‘presumption against extraterritoriality’
existed or could have been invoked by Congress in 1789”).
50. See Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 31.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (emphasis added). The 1789 version of the statute used the equally
expansive phrase “all causes where an alien sues for a tort only.” An act to Establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). Attorney General Bradford read the 1789
statute to reach “all cases where an alien sues for a tort only . . . .” Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y
Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795). Therefore, the unlimited textual reach has been to “all causes,” “all cases,” and
“any civil action.”
52. See supra Part III A & C; supra note 46.
53. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d at 745 (“‘we are constrained by what § 1350 shows
on its face: no limitations as to . . . the locus of the injury,’” quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos,
Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992)), 745–46 (“There is more than one ‘clear
indication’ of extraterritorial applicability in both the ATS’s text and its context . . . The statute’s
explicit reference to the law of nations indicates that we must look beyond the law of the United
States to international law . . . These are all indications of extraterritorial applicability.”), 747 (“We
therefore conclude that the ATS is not limited to conduct occurring within the United States . . .”);
Sarei, 671 F.3d at 781 (“At the time of its enactment, the ATS was intended to encompass conduct both
within and beyond the United States . . .”), 782–83 (“Because the ATS targeted violations of the law of
nations . . . , both the international focus and the nature of the harm . . . signal” extraterritoriality and
“[t]aken together, the language of the statute, the historical context, and the nature of the harm
encompassed by ‘the law of nations,’ supply the necessary ‘clear indication’ that the ATS’s
jurisdictional grant . . . includes within its ambit at least some conduct occurring outside of the
United States”) (McKeown, J., concurring); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.10
(2d Cir. 2000) (“the text . . . seems to reach claims for international human rights abuses occurring
abroad”); In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp.2d 228, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (the ATS
“applies universal norms that forbid conduct regardless of territorial demarcations or sovereign
prerogatives” and the text and nature of the law violated support “inapplicability of the
presumption,” also noting that the ordinary presumption is not applicable in the Second and Ninth
Circuits regarding ATS litigation). See also supra note 33; supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.

Paust (Do Not Delete)

7/8/2014 3:00 PM

HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE ATS AFTER KIOBEL

39

[t]he very subject matter expressly covered by the Act rests in substantial part on
universal jurisdiction as well as United States obligations to not deny justice to
aliens injured in the U.S. or abroad and to provide access to our courts. The
customary prohibition of “denial of justice” applicable at the time of formation of
the Act has been expanded today under customary and treaty-based human
rights law that also requires access to courts and an effective remedy for human
rights violations.54

Surprisingly, Chief Justice Roberts rightly recognized that violations of
international law “affecting aliens can occur either within or outside the United
States” but, instead of confirming that violations of international law expressly
addressed in the ATS therefore necessarily can occur in a foreign state, he
claimed that “nothing in the text of the statute suggests . . . an extraterritorial
reach.”55 In sharp contrast, Justice Breyer correctly emphasized that “[t]he
ATS . . . was enacted with ‘foreign matters’ in mind” and “[t]he statute’s text
refers explicitly to ‘alien[s],’ ‘treat[ies],’ and ‘the law of nations.’”56 As he rightly
added, in lieu of the borderless nature of the text:
I would assume that Congress intended the statute’s jurisdictional reach to
match the statute’s underlying substantive grasp. That grasp . . . includes
compensation for those injured by piracy and its modern-day equivalents . . . .
And just as we have looked to established international substantive norms to
help determine the statute’s substantive reach . . . so we should look to
international jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s jurisdictional
scope.57

Of great additional significance is the fact that in 1992, when Congress
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA),58 “Congress endorsed the
Filartiga line of cases,” which clearly had been based in part on universal
jurisdiction, had involved conduct of foreign and U.S. individual and corporate
defendants outside the United States,59 and had often involved a mere temporary
presence of the defendant in the United States.60 The House and Senate Reports
54. Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 30.
55. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1661, 1665.
56. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 1673.
58. Pub. L. No. 102-256; 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
59. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996);
Paust, History of the Act, supra note 26, at 256 & n.19; see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d at 745
(“Congress . . . implicitly ratified such lawsuits”); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1217 (9th Cir.
2007); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[t]he text of the
[ATS] seems to reach claims for international human rights abuses occurring abroad. We reached the
conclusion that such claims are properly brought under the Act in Filartiga; Congress ratified our
conclusion by passing the” TVPA); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) , cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1005 (1996) (“[t]he scope of the Alien Tort Act remains undiminished . . .”); In re Estate of
Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995);
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116, 1132 n.96 (C.D. Cal. 2002). See also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at
1677 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Congress, while aware of the award of civil damages
under the ATS – including cases such as Filartiga with foreign plaintiffs, defendants, and conduct –
has not sought to limit the statute’s jurisdictional or substantive reach”).
60. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237. Kadic is one of the landmark decisions within the Filartiga line
of cases, especially with respect to recognition of private actor liability for war crimes and genocide
over which there is universal jurisdiction. See id. at 239–43.
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focused on the fact that “universal principles” were incorporated; that “many of
the world’s governments” abroad engage in violations in their own territory and
against their own citizens; that Filartiga had recognized that “the universal
prohibition of torture had ripened into a rule of customary international law,
thereby bringing torture squarely within the language of the statute;” that the
ATS “should remain intact;” and that the TVPA “would . . . enhance the remedy
already available” under the ATS for alien plaintiffs and “extend a civil remedy
also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured abroad.”61 As Congress
endorsed the Filartiga line of cases, Congress expressly affirmed its purpose in
creating the TVPA:
To carry out obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter
and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights
by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an individual who
engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.62

Filartiga had also addressed the duty of states under the U.N. Charter to
achieve universal respect for, and observance of, human rights as well as certain
“significant” General Assembly resolutions that “specify with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter.”63
The fact that Congress clearly endorsed the Filartiga line of cases should be
determinative with respect to the lack of any sort of presumption against
extraterritoriality and should provide a key to the extraterritorial reach of the
ATS to violations of customary and treaty-based international law. As noted
below in Part III H, congressional endorsement of the Filartiga line of cases
should also restrain judicial adventurism into foreign policy and foreign
relations.64
Of additional importance is the fact that, although the ATS was revised in
1878,65 1911,66 and 1948,67 Congress never chose to set limits to what had been
recognized and undoubted in federal cases and Opinions of the Attorneys
General prior to 1948 as its extraterritorial reach to conduct of U.S. and foreign
violators of international law. For this reason, it would be inappropriate for
courts to add limits to the ATS that do not exist in the text of the statute and that
Congress has never chosen.

61. H.R. REP. NO. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 1, 85–86 (1991); S. REP. NO. 249, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 3–4 (1991) (same). Concerning the fact that the Executive had also recognized the
extraterritorial reach of the ATS at various times, including during the Filartiga litigation; see, e.g.,
Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 27 n.37.
62. TVPA, supra note 12, preamble.
63. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881–83.
64. See infra Part III H.
65. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG RES. SERV., RL 32118, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS at 5 (2003).
66. Ch. 231, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 24, para. 17, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, 1093 (codified as R.S. § 563,
para. 16, later as 28 U.S.C. § 41, para. 17) (Mar. 3, 1911).
67. Title 28, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1350, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (June 25, 1911).
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E. Origins of Causes of Action
Sosa and Kiobel focused on (1) “a claim under the law of nations as an
element of common law”68 when Congress has not spoken, and (2) judicial
power to “recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of”
international law when jurisdiction exists under the ATS.69 For Chief Justice
Roberts, from his opinion in Kiobel, a judicially recognized cause of action would
be the only source when using the ATS:
[t]he question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has jurisdiction to
entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law. The
question is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action
under U.S. law to enforce a norm of international law.70

With this singular focus, he avers that when courts recognize a cause of
action for violations of international law occurring abroad there is a “danger of
unwarranted judicial interference in the conduct of foreign policy”71 that is
presumably set up by alleged “‘clashes between our laws and those of other
nations.’”72
One problem with this focus is that a right to a remedy or cause of action
can arise under international law as well as under an act of Congress or
judicially-created “common law.” Additionally, the ATS expressly incorporates
international law by reference when using the language “committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”73 Quite clearly it is
international law that must be violated and that is incorporated by reference as
the substantive law.74 When international law provides a right to an effective
68. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
69. Id. at 732. Prior to Sosa, nearly every judicial opinion had concluded that the ATS creates a
cause of action. Early cases and opinions of the Attorneys General pointed to the same conclusion.
See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 26 F. Cas. 33, 33 (C.C.D. Maine 1827) (No. 15,258) (Story, J: “gives . . .
right . . . to sue”); M’Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 6,810) (“sue here for a tort ...
the suit will be sustained”); Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356, 358 (D.S.C. 1794)
(No. 7,216) (“the powers of the district courts are expressed . . . as to civil causes . . . where an alien
sues for a tort only”); 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 250, 252–53 (1907) (ATS provides “a forum and a right of
action”); 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58 (1795) (“the company or individuals who have been injured by these
acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States.”); Paust, History of the
Act, supra note 26, at 250–52 n.3, 254 & n.11.
70. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. 1661 (Roberts, C.J.).
71. Id. at 1664.
72. Id. at 1661, quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (a case
addressing U.S. law and not violations of international law or universal jurisdiction). See also infra
note 78 regarding the piracy statute.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
74. See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1672–73 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoted and
addressed at text infra notes 133–134; Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (“The norms being applied under the ATS are international”); Id. at 782 (McKeown, J.,
concurring) (“the ATS targeted violations of the law of nations at home and abroad and did so by
providing the law of nations ... as the source of the cause of action”); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654
F.3d 11, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Congress thus directed that the courts derive the rule of law from the
law of nations, and that law extends responsibility for conduct violating its norms to aiders and
abettors”); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (“violation of international law,”
“courts may fashion common law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international
law”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (“violations of
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remedy,75 it is international law, not domestic law, that provides a right to a
remedy that is being enforced through the ATS, and there will be no clash
between “our laws and those of other nations.”76 More generally, given that
international law is the substantive law incorporated by reference in the ATS,
international law is being enforced whether or not our courts fashion a remedy
for its violation and there will be no clash between domestic laws as the
substantive law that is being enforced. Further, the international law being
enforced with respect to violations occurring abroad is necessarily the relevant
substantive law at the place of its infraction and not foreign domestic law. As I
have noted in a prior writing,
the international law that is expressly incorporated and regulates relevant
conduct has no boundaries and, therefore, necessarily includes an extraterritorial
dimension that is also incorporated into the statute and enhances its
extraterritorial reach. The statutory phrase “any civil action” in tort in violation
of international law necessarily includes any of those arising in the U.S. or
abroad.77

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long recognized that incorporation of
international law by reference as the substantive law to be enforced is the
constitutional prerogative of Congress.78 When courts enforce international law
international law”), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp.2d 1080,
1099 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp.2d at 320–21; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
577 F. Supp. 860, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“the substantive principles to be applied” are those of
“international law” and the word tort means a wrong); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 10, 14 (2 ed. 2003); Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 20. The substantive law
that is expressly incorporated is decidedly not common law or some domestic law prescribed merely
by the United States and none of the early ATS cases or opinions of the Attorneys General referred to
“common law” as the substantive law. See also id. at 9, 39–41 n.50. Because the substantive law is
universal international law and treaty-based law, conflicts of law principles are necessarily irrelevant.
Further, international law implicating universal jurisdiction is law that has been applied in state,
federal, foreign, and international forums for the last two hundred plus years. See, e.g., text
accompanying infra notes 88, 94, 99, 101–102; infra note 78.
75. One such area of international law is customary and treaty-based human rights law. See
infra Part V.
76. But see supra note 72.
77. Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 20.
78. See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–30 (1942);
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158–62 (1820) (approving incorporation by reference
regarding the international crime of piracy in a 1789 statute contemporaneous with passage of the
ATS); JORDAN J. PAUST, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 155–64 (West 3 ed.
2009) (also addressing other relevant statutes). Chief Justice Roberts used a phrase “[a]pplying U.S.
law to pirates” [see Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1667 (Roberts, C.J.)], but he did not seem to realize that the
piracy statute approved in Smith incorporated customary international law by reference as the
substantive law and that what is actually being enforced or applied during prosecution is customary
international law over which there is universal jurisdiction, not our law. Because the ATS
incorporates customary international law for suits by alien plaintiffs, it is not directly relevant
whether such law is also directly incorporable without a federal statute. Nonetheless, direct
incorporation of customary international law has also occurred since the Founding. See, e.g., id. at
132–47, 433 (in federal courts), 579–81, 588 (in state courts); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27–28; Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 886–87; Jordan J. Paust, In Their Own Words: Affirmations of the Founders,
Framers, and Early Judiciary Concerning the Binding Nature of the Customary Law of Nations, 14 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205, 212–14, 231–39 (2008) (also noting that customary international law is
not mere “common law.” Id. at 219 n.42.); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
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that is incorporated by reference in a federal statute they have been permitted to
do so by Congress and are not engaging in an unwarranted interference in the
conduct of foreign policy. This method is exactly what Congress chose to do
when it enacted the ATS as a statute applying to “any” civil action in tort
involving a violation of international law that was incorporated by reference in
the statute and what Congress approved when it endorsed the Filartiga line of
cases.79 As noted in Parts III H and VI, permission from Congress and a lack of
unwarranted interference are all the more clear when the international law that is
incorporated by reference and being enforced is that over which there is a
universal jurisdictional competence of the United States and all other countries to
engage in effective enforcement. It is even more so when relevant international
law requires enforcement.80
F. Transitory Torts
With respect to the transitory tort doctrine where, by fiction, civil claims
follow the person,81 Chief Justice Roberts would seem to require that “when the
cause of action arose” abroad, there should be “a well-founded belief that it was
a cause of action in that place.”82 However, when customary international law
provides a right to a remedy and universal jurisdiction pertains, there will
necessarily be a right to a remedy “in that place” where the violation of
international law occurred as well as anywhere else.83 Similarly, a right to a
remedy under a treaty will be a right “in that place” where a violation occurs in
the territory of a party to the treaty and the treaty-based right to a remedy will
pertain in the courts of other parties to the treaty when they obtain personal
jurisdiction over the alleged violator. More generally, a violation of international
law over which there is universal jurisdiction will be a violation at the place
where it occurs as well as everywhere else.

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §111(1)-(3) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; PAUST, supra note 43, at 7–
10 (regarding constitutional bases, direct incorporation of customary international law, and the fact
that such law is not simplistically mere common law).
79. See supra Part III D. It is also what the Executive has approved. See, e.g., supra note 61.
80. See also Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (addressing “treaties
obliging the United States to find and punish foreign perpetrators” – some of which also require civil
remedies.). See also infra Part V.
81. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 885 (regarding civil suits against individuals,
customary international law also permits jurisdiction over “the settlement of claims between persons
... present in the territory” under the well-recognized fiction that civil claims follow the person.); See,
e.g., JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, COVEY T. OLIVER, NOYES E. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 128 (2
ed. 1981); PAUST, ET. AL., supra note 78, at 595.
82. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1661 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479
(1912) (a case that did not address international law or universal jurisdiction)).
83. See also infra Part VI.
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G. Custos Morum – the Full Story
1.

Seven

Points

Regarding

Custos

Morum

and

International

Law

Chief Justice Roberts quoted a portion of Justice Story’s remarks in United
States v. The La Jeune Eugenie84 as a basis for argument that there was “no
indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely
hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.”85 Justice Story
had remarked: “No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the
whole world.”86 However, Story’s remark is decidedly inapposite. First, Justice
Story did not use the phrase custos morum in order to deny jurisdiction of our
courts as a hospitable forum for enforcement with respect to violations of
international law engaged in by private perpetrators – just the opposite. Second,
Justice Story apparently had in mind an implied impermissibility of judging a
foreign nation with respect to our morality (i.e., custos morum) or its domestic
law. Third, at the time he made his remark and subsequently, it had been and is
expected that all states are guardians of international law over which there is
universal jurisdiction and responsibility, especially human rights law,87 and
Story’s fuller set of remarks is manifestly consistent with that viewpoint and the
need for our courts to apply the universal public law of nations against foreign
individual perpetrators. Fourth, writing for the Court two years earlier, Justice
Story had unmistakably affirmed the propriety of U.S. sanctions against
perpetrators of “an offence against the universal law of society” that like the
ATS, had been incorporated by reference in a federal statute at the same time as
its creation.88 Fifth, in an 1827 opinion Justice Story affirmed that the ATS
“gives . . . [a] right . . . to sue” for the enforcement of international law.89 Sixth, in
The Santissima Trinidad,90 during the same year that La Jeune Eugenie was decided,
Justice Story famously ruled for the Supreme Court that property taken abroad
in violation of the law of nations “is liable to the jurisdiction of our Courts” when
subsequently brought into our ports and that a presumptive exemption exists as
a matter of comity only if foreign war ships demean “themselves according to
law.”91 Justice Story added per dictum that if a foreign sovereign “comes

84. United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. 882 (No. 15,551).
85. Kiobel, 133 S.Ct. at 1668 (Roberts, C.J.). See also Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death
of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 835, 837 (2013) (confusing custos
morum with international law that implicates “universal jurisdiction”).
86. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. at 847.
87. See infra Part V.
88. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161, 163 (1820) (Story, J.). He would expressly refer to
“universal law” in La Jeune Eugenie. See infra notes 94, 99.
89. United States v. Greene, 26 F.Cas. at 33.
90. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. 283 (1822) (Story, J.).
91. Id. at 353 (noting that at that time grounds for immunity of warships were “not founded
upon any notion that a foreign sovereign had an absolute right.”). Presenting nearly the same issues
as those raised in The Santissima Trinidad was a case arising out of the impermissible action of a
German warship of the Imperial German Navy during World War I addressed in Berg v. British and
African Steam Navigation Co. (The Prize Ship “Appam”), 243 U.S. 124, 153–56 (1917) (quoting The
Santissima Trinidad, id. at 154–55 (allowing alien private plaintiffs to sue for “restitution . . .
conformably to the laws of nations and the treaties and laws of the United States” for the German
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personally within our limits, although he generally enjoy a personal immunity,
he may become liable to judicial process in the same way, and under the same
circumstances, as the public ships of the nation.”92 Seventh, today foreign state
violations of international law can be addressed by our courts if sovereign
immunity does not pertain under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.93
2. Story’s Focus on Universal Law and Judicial Responsibility
What Justice Story actually emphasized in La Jeune Eugenie was that, “in an
American court of judicature, I am bound to consider the [slave] trade an offence
against the universal law of society and in all cases, where it is not protected by a
foreign government, to deal with it as an offence carrying with it the penalty of
confiscation.”94 He recognized the point that “if the African slave trade is
repugnant to the law of nations, no nation can rightly permit its subjects to carry
it on, or exempt them . . . [and] no nation can privilege itself to commit a crime
against the law of nations.”95 Yet, he thought that no nation should sit in
judgment of the domestic laws of another nation, as opposed to sitting in
judgment against private perpetrators of international law,96 for “[i]t would be
inconsistent with the equality and sovereignty of nations, which admit of no
common superior. No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the
whole world.”97
With respect to international law and universal jurisdiction over private
perpetrators, Justice Story quoted, with approval, a British case on point98 and
affirmed “the doctrine . . . that any trade contrary to the general law of
nations . . . may subject the vessel employed in that trade to confiscation” and
recognized that the British courts “applied the doctrine upon principles of
universal law, and asserted, that it might be applied to a claim of such a nature in
government’s violation both of the law of nations and relevant treaties)). Importantly, the Supreme
Court recognized jurisdiction and the right to a remedy despite the intervention of the German
ambassador, the claim that the U.S. court lacked jurisdiction, and the claim that since other
proceedings had been instituted in Germany the U.S. court should decline jurisdiction. See id. at 147,
152. The Supreme Court also noted that “an illegal capture would be invested with the character of a
tort.” Id. at 154.
92. Id. (e.g., the sovereign is not immune if the sovereign violates the law of nations). See also 9
Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 357 (1859) (“a law which operates on the interests and rights of other States or
peoples must be made and executed according to the law of nations. A sovereign who tramples upon
the public law of the world cannot excuse himself by pointing to a provision in his own municipal
code ... public law must be paramount to local law in every question where local laws are in
conflict”).
93. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441(d), 1602–1611, et seq.
[hereinafter FSIA].
94. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. at 847.
95. Id. Earlier, Justice Story had been among those Justices who had and would consistently
recognize that the President of the United States is bound by the laws of war. See, e.g., Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. 110, 149, 153 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting); Paust, supra note 78, at 240–44.
96. See La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. at 847–51. This viewpoint regarding foreign domestic laws
would change when they were violative of international law. See, e.g., supra note 92; infra note 105.
97. Id. at 847.
98. Id. at 847–48 (quoting The Amedie, 1 Act. 240, 1 Dod. 84, note (including: “We cannot
certainly compel the subjects of other nations to observe any other, than the first and generally
received principles of universal law . . . . We are of the opinion, upon the whole, that persons engaged
in such a trade cannot, upon principles of universal law,” avoid jurisdiction and proper sanctions)).
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any court.”99 In this sense, Justice Story affirmed an earlier affirmation by Justice
Iredell of universal jurisdiction that is still of great importance with respect to the
reach of United States competence to address violations of international law and
as background for interpretation of the ATS.100 As Justice Iredell made clear in
1795, “all . . . trespasses committed against the general law of nations, are
enquirable, and may be proceeded against, in any nation where no special
exemption can be maintained, either by the general law of nations, or by some
treaty which forbids or restrains it.”101 It is the same general point that Justice
Johnson had made in 1820 with respect to the crime of piracy, which “is
considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations. It is
against all, and punished by all . . . within this universal jurisdiction.”102
On foreign policy or other concerns of governments, Justice Story noted that
with respect to violations of universal law by private perpetrators, “[u]nder such
circumstances this court must follow the duty prescribed to it by law,
independently of any wishes of our own government or of France.”103 In 1866,
this clear focus on judicial restraint and responsibility to enforce international
law was embraced by Chief Justice Chase: “we administer the public law of
nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular . . .
disadvantage of our own or another country.”104 Subsequent judicial opinions
have affirmed that courts must be restrained from addressing foreign relations
and foreign state concerns when universal jurisdiction is exercised over
violations of international law and that application of identifiable international
law is not to be restrained by judicially created political question or act of state
doctrines, especially when Congress has incorporated international law as the
substantive law to be effectuated through the ATS.105
99. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. at 848.
100. See infra Part VI.
101. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 159–61 (1795) (Iredell, J., concurring). Quoted approvingly by
Chief Justice Marshall in The Divina Pastora, 17 U.S. 52, 65–66 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
102. United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820) (Johnson, J.). See also United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. at 161, 163 (supra text accompanying note 88; United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144,
147–48 (1820) (argument of the Att’y Gen.) (piracy “is an offence against all. It is punishable in the
Courts of all . . . [and our courts] are . . . bound to punish”).
103. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. at 851.
104. The Peterhoff, 72 U.S. 28, 57 (1866) (Chase, C.J.).
105. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d at 746 (“foreign relations difficulties and intrusions
into the sovereignty of other nations” are not relevant with respect to “conduct that is illegal
everywhere” under international law); In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp.2d 228,
247 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ATS “applies universal norms that forbid conduct regardless of territorial
demarcations or sovereign prerogatives”); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp.2d 38, 52–54
(D.D.C. 2000) (“states are on notice that state sponsorship of terrorism is condemned by the
international community” and “nations that operate in a manner inconsistent with international
norms should not expect to be granted the privilege of immunity from suit” and have “adequate
warning of possible U.S. sanctions, including lawsuits in U.S. courts” (quoting Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 23)); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. at 862 (no “justifiable
offense” to a foreign state can occur when universal jurisdiction is exercised over violations of
international law); supra note 91. In fact, no state has authority to authorize violations of international
law and violations by a state within its borders are not lawful “sovereign,” “public,” or “official” acts
and are not simplistically or in any sense merely the internal affairs of a particular state. See, e.g.,
Opinion and Judgment, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1946) (“the doctrine of
sovereignty of the State . . . cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by
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H. Section 403 of the Restatement Is Inapplicable and Inapt
The sage recognitions noted above by Justice Story, Chief Justice Chase, and
other judges are in apparent contrast to efforts by some judges to abandon
judicial restraint and use an ad hoc comity-factors approach to obviate
jurisdiction that Congress and the Executive have chosen when enacting
extraterritorial legislation. Justice Breyer might prefer to do this under the guise
of “principles and practices of foreign relations law” that are supposedly
reflected in Section 403 of the Restatement.106 However, it is important to note
that, despite a claim made in the Restatement concerning its preference for a
comity-factors limitation of the reach of certain forms of jurisdictional
competence,107 Section 403 is not part of international law,108 much less “foreign
international law . . . . He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorizing action moves outside its competence
under international law”); United States v. Von Leeb (The High Command Case), in 11 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10,
at 462, 489 (1950) (“International law operates as a restriction and limitation on the sovereignty of
nations”); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1210 (9th Cir. 2007) (“acts of racial discrimination
cannot constitute official sovereign acts,” also quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699, 718 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[i]nternational law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens
as a sovereign act”)); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting)
(“officials receive no immunity for acts that violate international jus cogens human rights norms
(which by definition are not legally authorized acts.)”); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 958–59
(9th Cir. 2002); Altmann v. Republic of Argentina, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting West v.
Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1987) (“violations of international law are not
‘sovereign’ acts”); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (war crimes do not raise
political question concerns); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation Hilao v.
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (human rights violations, including
torture, are not lawful public acts of state), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Liu v. Republic of China,
892 F.2d 1419, 1432–33 (9th Cir. 1989) (act of state doctrine not applied to assassination, which is not
in the “public interest,” and a strong international consensus exists that it is illegal), cert. dismissed,
497 U.S. 1058 (1990); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 2007 WL 2349345 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Siderman);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.2d at 344–35 (adjudication of
genocide, war crimes, enslavement, and torture is not barred by the act of state doctrine); Cabiri v.
Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (defendant could not argue that torture fell
within the scope of his authority); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162, 176 (D. Mass. 1995) (“these
actions exceed anything that might be considered to have been lawfully within the scope of
Gramajo’s official authority,” and quoting Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C.
1980) (assassination is “clearly contrary to precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and
international law” and “there is no discretion to commit, or to have one’s officers or agents commit,
an illegal act;” therefore, assassination cannot be part of official’s “discretionary” authority), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985)); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (defendant’s
argument regarding “the act of state and political question doctrines is completely devoid of merit.
The acts ... [of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and arbitrary detention in violation
of customary international law] hardly qualify as official public acts” and regarding the political
question doctrine, the claims present “clearly justiciable legal issues”); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.
Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (torture, arbitrary detention, and summary execution “are not
public official acts”).
106. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); infra Part IV.
107. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 403, Comment. A.
108. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 636; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 241–
42; Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 23. General patterns of practice and opinio juris simply do not exist
to support an alleged “law” that would require courts of all countries to obviate the extraterritorial
reach of domestic legislation based on permissible territorial, nationality, or protective jurisdiction in
accordance with the comity-factors limitations listed in Section 403 of the Restatement. Such a
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relations law.” Even more significant, Section 403 expressly does not apply
when Section 404 is applicable i.e., when universal jurisdiction pertains over
violations of international law – especially because the very essence of universal
jurisdiction is that it allows sanctions against perpetrators wherever they are
found and, as expressly recognized in Section 404, there are “no links” with the
forum state that is enforcing international law.109 When Congress exercises such
an unmistakably universal competence, Congress has chosen to allow
enforcement of international law and not to ignore it or limit its reach.
It is of further interest that U.S. courts do not generally use a comity-factors
approach to obviate jurisdiction, especially when the United States has
nationality or protective jurisdiction;110 that Congress has generally ignored a
comity-factors approach when adopting or reaffirming extraterritorial
legislation, especially with respect to international crimes;111 and that the political
branches are best suited to identify appropriate foreign policy and related
comity-type interests, their proper weight, and how and whether to balance them
among themselves and among other competing interests.112
Of significant import has been the prior warning of the Supreme Court that
judicial application of a statute “on a purely ad hoc weighing of contacts basis . . .
would inevitably lead to embarrassment of foreign affairs and be entirely
infeasible in actual practice.”113 Judicial use of such an approach would
inevitably be haphazard, inflexible, and unreasonable with respect to various
policies at stake and would be unpredictable, leaving others without adequate
notice and guidance whether extraterritorial jurisdiction might be exercised in a
given case.114 Such an outcome is especially undesirable in a democracy when
unelected and relatively isolated judges would obviate the extraterritorial reach
of legislation chosen by Congress and the Executive and clearly endorsed by a
subsequent Congress.115
IV. CRITERIA PROFFERED BY CERTAIN JUSTICES ARE IN CONTRAST TO CLEAR
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL
Criteria offered by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito that are identified
in Part II are tied to the judicially-created presumption against extraterritoriality.
For this reason, they should not be used when the presumption is found to be
inapplicable – for example, because Congress has endorsed the Filartiga line of

limitation would only exist under a treaty or Executive Agreement chosen by the political branches
and such is the normal and preferable way to handle foreign policy consequences or concerns.
109. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 404 and cmt. a; PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 639–
40; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 244; supra notes 59–60, 87, 91–92, 98–102.
110. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 636; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 241.
111. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 639; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 244.
112. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 636–39; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at
242–43.
113. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963).
114. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 637; PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 242.
For these reasons, metaphors such as slot machine decision making and loose judicial cannon are not
inappropriate.
115. See supra Part III D (regarding congressional endorsement of the ATS); see also infra note 136
(concerning possible dangers when universal jurisdiction applies).
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cases and universal jurisdiction has been part of the substantive grasp or
essential character of the law expressly incorporated in the ATS. Under the
circumstances, use of their criteria to limit what Congress has endorsed would be
the opposite of judicial restraint and could involve unwarranted judicial
interference in foreign policy concerns that are best left to the political branches.
As noted, use of a “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . .
with sufficient force” criterion would be highly restrictive and ambiguous.116 It
would also be clearly contrary to the congressional endorsement of the Filartiga
line of cases and a universal jurisdictional competence that has been traditionally
applied in ATS cases and is necessarily part of the substantive character of law
expressly incorporated in the statute. Its limiting use would also be inconsistent
with traditional and previously undoubted use of the ATS in litigation involving
conduct of U.S. nationals abroad in violation of customary or treaty-based
international law.
It is important to note, therefore, that neither Chief Justice Roberts nor
Justice Alito offered their criteria as requirements that must be met for ATS
litigation. The criteria were offered for displacement of a judicially-created
presumption that they considered to be applicable in general. Moreover, Chief
Justice Roberts offered the criteria as “even where” dictum, not as absolute
requirements.117 Additionally, Justice Alito focused approvingly on three
violations of international law mentioned by Blackstone and accepted in Sosa118
as being within the purview of the ATS and that clearly can occur entirely
outside the United States and implicate universal jurisdiction.119 Necessarily,
therefore, “touch and concern the territory of the United States” cannot be a
determinative test. Justice Alito would also require that relevant international
law satisfy the need for “definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.”120
But this requirement is already an understandable concern with respect to
adequate proof of the content of international law.121
Justice Kennedy noted that the Justices preferred “to leave open a number
of significant questions”122 and he did not use a touch and concern criterion.
Instead, he emphasized the circumstance where there are “allegations of serious
violations of international law principles protecting persons.”123 Presumably
Justice Kennedy would recognize that application of the ATS in such a
116. See supra notes 8-9, 22; see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Alito, J., concurring) (“This
formulation obviously leaves much unanswered”). Here, I treat the quoted language as one criterion,
although the language can be broken up into two criteria, e.g., (1) touch and concern, and (2) with
sufficient force.
117. See supra text accompanying note 8.
118. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723–24.
119. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 1673.
121. See, e.g., Paust, History of the Act, supra note 26, at 258–62, and numerous cases cited. Having
considered the need for adequate proof of the content of international law, courts have found, for
example, that torture, cruel and inhuman treatment; arbitrary detention; hostage-taking;
disappearance of persons; summary execution; war crimes; genocide; other crimes against humanity;
race discrimination; and terrorist bombings are actionable. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at
425–98, 820, and cases cited; Paust, Nonstate Actors, supra note 43, at 987–89 & n.38.
122. See supra note 10.
123. See supra note 13.
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circumstance would be clearly consistent with extraterritoriality manifest from
the face of the statute in light of the nature of the law incorporated and its
jurisdictional character, the early history of use of the ATS, the nature and
understandable reach of piracy, attention to other early violations of
international law that are addressed in Part III C, the Filartiga line of cases, and
the endorsement of the Filartiga line of cases by Congress.
Justice Breyer’s criteria are not tied to a presumption against
extraterritoriality, which he notes should not apply, but he might abandon
judicial restraint in the face of a statute with an unmistakable substantive grasp
implicating universal jurisdiction and congressional endorsement of the Filartiga
line of cases unless his third articulated circumstance will comply. As he stated,
he prefers to be “guided in part by principles and practices of foreign relations
law,”124 although he might not have realized that the Restatement’s comityfactors approach is not law125 and expressly would not apply when universal
jurisdiction pertains and necessarily, therefore, sanctions against perpetrators are
understood to be appropriate wherever they are found.126
At a minimum, he
would find jurisdiction under this statute where (1) the alleged tort occurs on
American soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national
interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
732 (2004) (“‘[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become – like the
pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
mankind.’ (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (CA2 1980))”).127

It is this third circumstance that could include proper attention to universal
jurisdiction that is within the substantive grasp of the statute as well as the
Filartiga line of cases approved by Congress if he would affirm that conduct in
violation of international law over which there is universal jurisdiction and
responsibility “substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest.”128
He rightly noted that piracy was “found to fall within the statute’s scope” in
Sosa,129 and that “Sosa essentially leads today’s judges to ask: Who are today’s
pirates?”130 He added:
Certainly today’s pirates include torturers and perpetrators of genocide. And
today, like the pirates of old, they are “fair game” where they are found. Like
those pirates, they are “common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an

124. See supra note 20.
125. See supra note 108.
126. See supra note 109; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring) (affirming in Sosa
“recognition of universal jurisdiction . . . is consistent with principles of international comity”).
127. Kiobel 133 S. Ct. at 167 (Breyer, J. concurring).
128. Id. at 1674.
129. Id. at 1672 (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715).
130. Id. (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25).
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equal interest in their apprehension and punishment.131

And in Sosa he had recognized that universal jurisdiction exists over
“torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,” and that
enforcement of sanctions when “universal jurisdiction” exists will be “consistent
with principles of international comity.”132 Importantly, in Kiobel he rightly
stressed that “just as we have looked to established international substantive
norms to help determine the statute’s substantive reach . . . , so we should look to
international jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s jurisdictional
scope,”133 and he assumed “that Congress intended the statute’s jurisdictional
reach to match the statute’s underlying substantive grasp . . . [which] includes
compensation for those injured by piracy and its modern day equivalents.”134
Universal jurisdiction and customary and treaty-based duties to provide
sanctions were also addressed in his opinion, as well as the fact that other
countries have exercised such competencies.135
One would expect, therefore, that Justice Breyer would agree that an
important U.S. interest is substantially at stake at least when violations of
international law implicating universal jurisdiction that are within the statute’s
grasp have occurred and the U.S. has an obligation to provide effective sanctions.
However, having used his personal “foreign relations” comity-factors form of
judicial limitation that is not actually part of law and which, under the
Restatement is clearly inapplicable when universal jurisdiction exists, he
concluded that enforcement of international law in the case before the Court
would not “vindicate a distinct American interest,”136 as if he and not Congress
should make such a determination.137 Further, his conclusion would be incorrect
if he assumed that the United States does not have a distinct interest at stake
with respect to its compliance with and enforcement of international law.138
From a historical perspective, that very interest was evidently of concern when

131. Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 404, RN 1; quoting In re Demjanjuk, 612 F.
Supp. 544, 556 (N.D. Ohio 1985)).
132. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 672 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
133. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 1673–74.
136. Id. at 1678 (applying his “foreign relations” construct here might indicate that it is
ultimately parochial, unavoidably at odds with universal jurisdiction and, therefore, on the wrong
side of history).
137. But see supra Part III H; Rachel Lopez, The Judicial Expansion of American Exceptionalism, 6
DUKE FORUM FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE at Part IV (2014). Presumably he would not use his “foreign
relations” construct to destroy the extraterritorial reach of our war crimes legislation (for two sets of
legislation and their reach, see, e.g., PAUST, BASSIOUNI, ET AL., supra note 25, at 274–82); the piracy
statute (18 U.S.C. § 1651, which is rather like the ATS); the TVPA (supra note 12); the torture statute
(18 U.S.C. § 1091 et seq.); the Antiterrorism Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333); the state sponsored terrorism
statute (28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008)); the hostage-taking act (18 U.S.C. § 1203); the protection of
internationally protected persons act (18 U.S.C. § 112); or several other forms of legislation, including
that regarding aircraft hijacking, aircraft sabotage, international drug trafficking, human trafficking,
or slavery and the slave trade – a few of which he mentions seemingly favorably. Focusing on the
fact that universal jurisdiction and responsibility exist and appropriate deference to Congress can
help to avoid such an unwanted outcome.
138. See infra Part V.
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Congress created the ATS139 and was expressed by Congress at the time when
Congress endorsed the Filartiga line of cases.140
V. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND RESPONSIBILITIES
As noted by Congress, the United States has “obligations . . . under the
United Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the
protection of human rights.141 Filartiga had recognized that such obligations of
the United States exist under Articles 55(c) and 56 of the United Nations Charter,
which expressly require “universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights,”142 and that such Charter-based obligations are specified also in a number
of United Nations declarations.143 In particular,
This prohibition [of torture] has become part of customary international law, as
evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General
Assembly Resolution 217 (III) (A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states in the plainest of
terms, “no one shall be subjected to torture.” The General Assembly has declared
that the Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration “constitute
basic principles of international law.”144

Further, the Executive’s Amicus Brief in Filartiga noted that in applying the
ATS with respect to alleged torture in violation of customary international law,
“courts are properly confined to determining whether an individual has suffered
a denial of rights guaranteed him as an individual by customary international
law,” and added that “a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these
circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s
commitment to the protection of human rights.”145
The rights of access to courts and to an effective remedy are also reflected in
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,146 which mirrors patterns

139. See Paust, History of the Act, supra note 26, at 254–55.
140. See, supra note 62.
141. See id.
142. See U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c), 56. See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 672–73 (1948)
(Murphy, J., concurring, with whom Rutledge, J., joins) (a California law “stands as a barrier to the
fulfillment of” the U.S. obligation under Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter and “[i]ts inconsistency
with the Charter ... is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned”); id. at 649–50 (Black,
J., concurring, with whom Douglas, J., joins) (“How can this nation be faithful to this international
pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race are
permitted to be enforced?”). Obligations under the U.N. Charter prevail over those in any other
international agreement. Id. at Art. 103.
143. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881–83. See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d at 240; In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d at 499.
144. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882 (citing G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970)).
145. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae (1980), in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), at 22–23, available at 19 I.L.M. 585, 607–08 (1980).
146. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating” human rights), U.N. G.A. Res. 217A, 3
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). On the nature of the Universal Declaration (1) as
customary international law, and (2) as an authoritative aid for interpretation of human rights
protected by and through the U.N. Charter, see, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL,
LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 272–74, 302, 325–30 (1980); PAUST, supra
note 74, at 181, 191, 198–200, 228 n.182, 246 n.372, 256 n.468, 286 n.595, 436–37 n.48; Filartiga v. Pena-
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of generally shared expectation concerning customary roots of the right to an
effective remedy in domestic courts for violations of human rights and various
other rights under international law.147 As part of human rights law, rights of
access to courts and to an effective remedy are also necessarily part of U.N.
Charter-based obligations of all members of the United Nations to assure
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights.”148
Prominent among treaty-based human rights at stake are the right of access
to courts, to a remedy, and nonimmunity that are based in Articles 2(3)(a) and
14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),149 as
supplemented in General Comments of the Human Rights Committee that
operates under the auspices of the International Covenant.150 Article 50 of the
Irala, 630 F.2d at 882 (quoted in text supra at note 144); Rodriguez Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.
Supp. 787, 796–97 (D. Kan. 1980); U.S. Memorial before the International Court of Justice in Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings;
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980), at 9, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 593 (1980).
147. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 74, at 224–29.
148. See U.N. Charter, arts. 55(c), 56. See also Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of
the United Nations, U.N. G.A. Res. 2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1971) (“Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action universal
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the
Charter.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881–82 (quoted in text at note 142 supra); TVPA, supra
note 12, prmbl. (quoted in text at note 62 supra); Memorandum for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), supra note 145, at 9 (“the Universal
Declaration ... goes beyond the U.N. Charter in specifying and defining fundamental rights to which
all individuals are entitled”); Id. at 20–21 (“It has long been established that in certain situations,
individuals may sue to enforce their rights under international law. . . The . . . international law of
human rights ... endows individuals with the right to invoke international law. . . . As a result, in
nations such as the United States where international law is part of the law of the land, an
individual’s fundamental human rights are in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic
courts”), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 592, 602–03 (1980).
149. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 9, 1966)
[hereinafter ICCPR], arts. 2(3)(a) (requiring signatories to “ensure that any person whose rights . . .
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity”); Id. at 14(1) (“All persons shall be equal before the courts
and tribunals. In the determination of . . . his rights and obligations in as suit at law, everyone shall
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law”). Both provisions are set forth with mandatory “shall” language that provides an
immediate duty and is typically self-executing. An attempted declaration of partial non-selfexecution with respect to Articles 1-27 of the Covenant is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty and, therefore, necessarily void ab initio as a matter of law. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 74, at
362–66; infra note 150. In any event, the declaration expressly does not reach Article 50 of the treaty,
which mandates application of all of the provisions of the treaty within the United States. See, e.g.,
infra note 151. The ICCPR is also universal in scope. See ICCPR, supra at pmbl. (“universal”).
150. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL., supra note 78, at 83–84, 412–13; Dubai Petroleum Co., et al. v. Kazi, 12
S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000) (“Article 14(1) requires all signatory countries to confer the right of equality
before the courts to citizens of all other signatories. . . . The Covenant not only guarantees foreign
citizens equal treatment in the signatories courts, but also guarantees them equal access to these
courts),” also citing H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 13 (1984), 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40, at
143, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984)); H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 7, ¶1 (1982) (“Complaints about
ill-treatment must be investigated.... [and with respect to personal responsibility, t]hose found guilty
must be held responsible, and the alleged victims must themselves have effective remedies at their
disposal, including the right to obtain compensation.”); Report of the H.R. Comm., 37 U.N. GAOR,
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Covenant expressly mandates that all of “[t]he provisions of the present
Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or
exceptions,”151 thereby assuring that rights and duties under the treaty apply
with respect to judicial proceedings within the United States in which claims to
fair compensation proceed.
For the victims of torture, a mandatory duty to provide fair compensation,
including means for rehabilitation, is set forth in Article 14 of the Convention
Against Torture152:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation,
including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the
death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled
to compensation.153

Undoubtedly for these reasons, the United Nations General Assembly
emphasized in 2008 and 2007 that “national legal systems must ensure that
Supp. No. 40, Annex V, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Add.1/963 (1982); H.R. Comm., General Comment
No. 20, ¶ 15 (1992) (“States must not deprive individuals of the right to an effective remedy,
including compensation”), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994); H.R. Comm., General
Comment No. 24, ¶ 11 (“a State could not make a reservation to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the
Covenant, indicating that it intends to provide no remedies for human rights violations. Guarantees
such as these are an integral part of the structure of the Covenant and underpin its efficacy”); Id. at ¶
12 (“where there is an absence of provisions to ensure that Covenant rights may be sued on in
domestic courts ... all the essential elements of the Covenant guarantees have been removed” and an
attempted reservation to that effect is void ab initio as a matter of law because it “would be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant”, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/Rev.1/add.6 (2 Nov. 1994)).
151. ICCPR, supra note 149, at art. 50. Article 50 is set forth with mandatory “shall” language
that provides an immediate duty and is typically self-executing. Moreover, it expressly requires that
all provisions of the Covenant shall apply in all parts of a federated state without exception. The
United States had no reservation with respect to Article 50 and it clearly operates directly within the
United States with respect to all of “[t]he provisions of the ... Covenant.” See PAUST, supra note 74, at
362.
152. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984) [hereinafter CAT].
153. CAT, supra note 152, at art. 14(1). Both sentences quoted contain a duty that is phrased in
mandatory “shall” language that provides textual clarity regarding the immediate mandatory duty
and that is typically self-executing. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 74, at 72, 90 n.98, 129–30 n.14. Article
14 of the CAT necessarily applies to acts of public officials covered under Article 1 of the treaty and,
therefore, Articles 1 and 14 necessarily assure nonimmunity of public officials. See also Committee
Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention:
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture, United States of America, 36th sess.,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (18 May 2006), ¶¶ 14 (the U.S. “should recognize and ensure that the
Convention applies at all times, whether in peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its
jurisdiction . . . .”), 15 (“provisions of the Convention . . . apply to, and are fully enjoyed by, all
persons under the effective control of its authorities, of whichever type, wherever located in the
world”), 19 (there exists an “absolute prohibition of torture . . . without any possible derogation”), 28
(“The State party should ensure, in accordance with the Convention, that mechanisms to obtain full
redress, compensation and rehabilitation are accessible to all victims of acts of torture or abuse,
including sexual violence, perpetrated by its officials.”), 32 (“ensure that all allegations of violence in
detention centres are investigated promptly and independently, perpetrators are prosecuted and
appropriately sentenced and victims can seek redress, including appropriate compensation.”),
available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/CAT.C.USA.CO.2.pdf.
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victims of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment obtain redress, are awarded fair and adequate compensation and
receive appropriate social and medical rehabilitation.”154 Earlier in the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation,155 the
General Assembly provided informing detail concerning the right to “equal and
effective access to justice”156 and to an effective judicial remedy for victims of
violations of human rights law,157 as well as the type of “[a]dequate, effective and
prompt reparation,” compensation, rehabilitation, and “satisfaction” required by
international law.158
With respect to the customary and jus cogens crime against humanity and
violation of human rights known as forced disappearance or secret detention,159
it is significant that the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
From Enforced Disappearance160 affirms expectations of the international
community that each state party “shall ensure in its legal system that the victims
of enforced disappearance have the right to obtain reparation and prompt, fair
and adequate compensation” and that reparation “covers material and moral
damages and, where appropriate, other forms of reparation such as: (a)
[r]estitution; (b) [r]ehabilitation; (c) [s]atisfaction, including restoration of dignity
and reputation; [and] (d) [g]uarantees of non-repetition.”161
Within the Americas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights awarded
compensation to the family of a victim of forced disappearance in the now

154. G.A. Res. 63/166, U.N. GAOR, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 63rd Sess., at ¶ 18 (Dec. 18, 2008); U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/166 (Feb. 19, 2009); U.N. G.A.
Res. 62/148, ¶ 13 (Dec. 18, 2007); U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/148 (Mar. 4, 2008). Similar prior resolutions
with the same name reaffirmed many of the points contained in the 2007 and 2008 resolutions. See,
e.g., U.N. G.A. Res. 61/153, pmbl. (Dec. 19, 2006); U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/153 (Feb. 14, 2007); U.N. G.A.
Res. 60/148 (Dec. 16, 2005); U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/148 (Feb. 21, 2006). Importantly, torture, cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment are not merely treaty-based violations of international law (e.g., in
the CAT, ICCPR, and law of war treaties). They are also violations of customary norms jus cogens.
See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 74, at 4, 141–43 nn.39–40, 184 n.40, 190 n.59; RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, §
702(d) & cmnts. a, n, RN 11.
155. G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. GAOR, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 60th Sess. (Dec. 16, 2005); U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147
(Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Right to Remedy Resolution]. For more detailed exposition of the
principles and their development, see, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’
Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 260–74 (2006).
156. Right to Remedy Resolution, supra note 155, Annex, part VIII, ¶ 3(c), 11.
157. Id., Annex, pmbl., part VIII, 12.
158. See id., Annex, part IX, ¶¶15–22.
159. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 74, at 34–41; RESTATEMENT, supra note 78, § 702(c) & cmts. a, c, n,
RNs 1, 11.
160. See G.A. Res. 61/177, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess. (Dec. 20, 2006).
161. Id. art. 24(4)-(5); see also id. at pmbl. (“[T]he victims of enforced disappearance have the right
to obtain reparation”). The right to “an effective remedy” and “adequate compensation” for victims
of enforced disappearance was recognized earlier by the General Assembly in its 1992 Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR arts. 9, 19
(Dec. 18, 1992), 47 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/133 (Feb. 12, 1993). See id.
art. 5 (such conduct renders “perpetrators and the State or State authorities which organize, acquiesce
in or tolerate such disappearances liable under civil law.”).
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famous Velasquez Rodriguez Case.162 Article 63(1) of the American Convention on
Human Rights163 allows the Inter-American Court to decide “that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party.”164 As recognized by the InterAmerican Court in a later case, Article 63(1) “codifies a rule of customary
international law which is one of the fundamental principles of modern
international law, that being the responsibility of States . . . to make
reparation.”165 More recently, the Court declared:
It is a principle of International Law that any breach of an international
obligation resulting in harm gives rise to the duty to adequately redress such
harm . . . . The obligation to compensate is governed by International Law and it
may be neither modified nor disregarded by the State in reliance upon its
domestic law . . . .
The reparation of the damage flowing from a breach of an international
obligation calls for, if practicable, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which
consists in restoring a previously-existing situation. If not feasible, the
international court will then be required to define a set of measures such that, in
addition to ensuring the enjoyment of the rights that were violated, the
consequences of those breaches may be remedied and compensation provided
for the damage thereby caused. In addition, there is also the State’s obligation to
adopt affirmative measures to guarantee that no injurious occurrences such as
those analyzed in the case at hand will take place in the future.166

Although the United States has not yet ratified the American Convention,
within the United States and elsewhere in the Americas, the United States is
bound to take no action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
Convention, which would necessarily include human rights to freedom from
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to “fair
compensation” that are protected in the Convention. This obligation arises
because the United States signed the treaty in 1977 while awaiting ratification.167
162. Velazquez Rodriguez, Compensatory Damages, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Jul. 21, 1989), No.
7, Ann. Rep. of the Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1989, OAS/Ser.L/V/III.21 doc. 14, at 123 (1989), addressed in
RICHARD B. LILLICH, HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 799–802 (3 ed. 1995).
163. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 36 (1969), 144 U.N.T.S. 123.
164. Id. art. 63(1).
165. Garrido and Baigorria, Reparations, (Art. 63(1), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) (Aug. 27, 1998),
No. 39, ¶ 40; see also id.¶¶ 41, 47–65, 73 (“The case law of this Court has consistently been that the
State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the
means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment, and to ensure the
victim adequate compensation.”), 74 ([T]here is a “legal obligation to investigate . . . and to bring to
trial and punish the authors, accomplices, accessories after the fact, and all those who may have
played some role in the events that transpired.”).
166. La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 160 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) (Nov.29,
2006), ¶¶ 199–201. The Court added: “Reparations are measures aimed at removing the effects of the
violations. Their nature and amount are dependent upon the specifics of the violation and the
damage inflicted at both the pecuniary and non pecuniary levels. These measures may neither enrich
nor impoverish the victim or the victim’s beneficiaries, and they must bear proportion to the breaches
declared as such in the Judgment.” Id. at ¶202.
167. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18 (“A State is obligated to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty . . .
subject to ratification”, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969)).
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Additionally, the United States is bound by the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.168 The American Declaration affirms that “[e]very
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of person;”169 “[e]very
individual who has been deprived of his liberty . . . has the right to humane
treatment;”170 and “[e]very person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for
his legal rights.”171
VI. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND CHARMING BETSY
As noted, the judicially-created presumption of non-extraterritoriality was
unknown to creators of the ATS.172 However, a different principle of statutory
construction arose near that time that would operate to assure conformity of
federal statutes to international law – the Charming Betsy rule. It is a rule that had
earlier foundations and that has been continuously retained by the Supreme
Court.173 What the Court affirmed in Charming Betsy is that
[a]n Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains, and, consequently, can never be
construed to violate . . . rights . . . further than is warranted by the law of
nations.174

Application of the Charming Betsy rule requires that the ATS be interpreted
consistently with the type of international law that provides universal
jurisdiction and the rights under international law addressed in Part V, including
the prohibition of “denial of justice” to aliens and customary and treaty-based
human rights of access to courts and to an effective remedy.175 In fact, Charming

168. O.A.S. Res. XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965). As a party to the
Charter of the Organization of American States, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 2 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. 2367, the United
States is bound by the American Declaration, which is a legally authoritative indicia of human rights
protected through Article 3(k) of the O.A.S. Charter [see id. arts. 44, 111]. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion
OC-10/89, I-A, Inter-Am. Court H.R., Ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 10, ¶¶ 45, 47 (1989); InterAm. Comm. H.R., Report on the Situation of the Inhabitants of the Interior of Ecuador Affected by
Development Activities, Chapter VIII (1996), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10 rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 1977) (“The
American Declaration ... continues to serve as a source of international obligation for all member
states”); The “Baby Boy” Opinion, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. 25, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9
rev. 1 (1981), at ¶ 15 (“As a consequence of Article 3j, 16, 51e, 112 and 150 of [the O.A.S. Charter], the
provisions of other instruments and resolutions of the OAS on human rights acquired binding force.
Those instruments and resolutions of the OAS on human rights approved with the vote of the U.S.
Government” include the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. That Declaration
affirms several human rights, now protected through the O.A.S. Charter, including the right to
“resort to the courts to ensure respect for ... [one’s] legal rights” documented in Article XVIII); Roach
Case, No. 9647, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. 147, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), at ¶ 48; see also
LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 162, at 802–04; MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL, CHEN, supra note 146, at 198,
316; DAVID WEISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK, FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 598–
600 (3 ed. 1996).
169. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 168, art. I.
170. Id. at art. XXV.
171. Id. at art. XVIII.
172. See supra note 49.
173. See, e.g., PAUST, ET AL, supra note 78, at 153–54, and cases cited.
174. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 117–18 (1804).
175. See supra, Part V.
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Betsy requires that the ATS “can never be construed to violate . . . rights.”176
As noted above, extraterritoriality is manifest from the face of the statute
due to the nature of the law that is incorporated and its universal jurisdictional
character and substantive grasp, no limits to such an inherent extraterritoriality
are expressed in the statute, all of the early cases and opinions of the Attorneys
General support extraterritoriality, and Congress has subsequently endorsed the
Filartiga line of cases. Under these circumstances, Charming Betsy requires
recognition that a presumption of non-extraterritoriality does not apply and, in
any event, Charming Betsy requires that such a presumption cannot apply when
international law provides universal jurisdiction and rights of access to courts
and to an effective remedy. The Charming Betsy rule clearly should provide part
of the “further elaboration and explanation” for “proper implementation” that
Justice Kennedy prefers and should also condition Justice Breyer’s use of a new
inhibiting set of “foreign relations” criteria when international law provides
universal jurisdiction and the rights of access to courts and to an effective
remedy.
As noted, use of the Supreme Court’s rationale in the Bowman exception to
the presumption against extraterritoriality would lead to a similar result,177 as
affirmed in a number of lower court decisions that had applied the ATS to
extraterritorial conduct after the Court’s decision in Morrison.178
VII. CONCLUSION
The evident split in Kiobel has, in the words of Justice Kennedy, left open “a
number of significant questions regarding” proper elaboration and explanation
of the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Statute.179 Among these are whether
a presumption against extraterritoriality should apply and, if it is used, whether

176. Id.
177. See Paust, Kiobel, supra note 25, at 32–34.
178. Id. at 33, n.67, noting that cases decided after Morrison have noted that Morrison did not
overrule Bowman and/or that Bowman still provides an exception to the ordinary presumption when
universal, protective, or nationality jurisdiction under customary international law exists and
supports the extraterritorial reach of the ATS or a relevant criminal statute. See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d at 743–46, 758–60, 763–65 (extraterritoriality of the ATS is appropriate where
universal jurisdiction obtains over violations of international law of a universal nature and concern
and the text shows no geographical limitation); Sarei, 671 F.3d at 772, 776–79 (Pregerson, J.,
concurring) (extraterritoriality is supported by the existence of “universal customary international
law”); Sarei, 671 F.3d at 780–83 (McKeown, J., concurring) (the statutory focus on violations of the law
of nations, the nature of the harm, and the historical context support extraterritoriality of the ATS);
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 20–22 (the ATS has an “obvious extraterritorial reach,”
“universal jurisdiction” pertains, and Morrison does not control); United States v. Campbell, 798 F.
Supp.2d 293, 305, 308–09 (D.D.C. 2011) (statute applies extraterritorially where protective jurisdiction
exists and Bowman rationale applies instead of Morrison); United States v. Ayesh, 762 F. Supp.2d 832,
839–41 (E.D. Va. 2011) (same); United States v. Finch, No. 10-333, 2010 WL 3938176, at *3–4 (D. Haw.
2010) (same); United States v. Hijazi, _ F. Supp.2d _, 2011 WL 2838172, at *22, *24, *29 (C.D. Ill. 2011)
(same); see also United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811, 813–14 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Bowman
despite Morrison); United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1230, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (using nationality
jurisdiction under international law and Bowman to support extraterritoriality); United States v.
Galvis-Pena, 2011 WL 7268437, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (applying “Bowman exception” and emphasizing
“the inherently international scope of drug trafficking or smuggling”).
179. See text at note 10 supra.
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inconsistent and ambiguous criteria are preferable in deciding when it is
displaced. Extraterritoriality of some sort has been affirmed, but there is an
evident lack of consensus on rationales, doctrines, and criteria.
For this reason, it is important to reconsider what the full set of early cases
and opinions of Attorney General add for proper decision making regarding the
statute’s evident reach as well as what is compelled by adequate awareness of
the nature of the law that is expressly incorporated by reference and its
jurisdictional attributes and substantive grasp.
Further, congressional
endorsement of the Filartiga line of cases should displace a judicially-created
presumption as well as supposed “foreign relations” concerns and provide
needed guidance. Additionally, the Charming Betsy rule supplements the need to
interpret the statute consistently with universal jurisdiction and responsibility as
well as human rights of access to courts and to an effective remedy under
international law. The rationale in the Bowman exception to a presumption of
non-extraterritoriality supports that requirement.
More generally, it is not difficult to understand that the dignity of all is
diminished when the dignity of a few is ignored. As Justice Wilson noted, “[i]f
the dignity of each singly is undiminished, the dignity of all jointly must be
unimpaired.”180 The decision in Kiobel ignores the dignity of the claimants and
ultimately impairs our individual dignity and that of the United States.

180. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 456 (1793) (emphasis omitted). See also Thomas v. Parett,
524 F.2d 779, 787 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975) (Lay, J., dissenting); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a
Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145, 152
(1983).

